The objective of this paper is to examine the role of geography in explaining the patterns of financial integration among both developed and developing countries. W e investigate the determinants of North-North, North-South and South-North bilateral FDI inflows using a modified gravity model. The fact that the significance of geographical variables on FDI still remained even after controlling for the macroeconomic fundamentals, is in contrast with the standard capital market model. The results can, however, be reconciled if geographical factors can proxy for information costs, which may in turn explain why country portfolios are still home-biased.
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to examine the role of geography in explaining the patterns of financial integration among both developed and developing countries. Financial integration, that is, the integration of countries into international financial markets, has become an important policy topic in the last few decades. This study examines the role of geography in the spatial allocation patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI). As FDI has become an important source of foreign finance, its patterns of allocation can indicate whether geography matters for a host country to attract financial flows, hence its level of financial integration. The stylized fact that bilateral FDI flows, especially between developed and developing countries, are geographically concentrated in certain countries in certain regions, is in contrast with portfolio diversification theories and with the neoclassical model. 1 The forces of financial integration, like the forces of global economic integration, are driven by prospects of reduced costs of capital for businesses, a diversification of investment opportunities and more efficient allocation of capital, and ultimately, increased economic growth. However, the problems of information asymmetries are well recognized in international financial markets. The 'home bias' literature argues that there is considerable market frictions caused by imperfect information that the countries' foreign asset portfolios are biased towards the domestic market and not optimally diversified (French and Poterba 1991: 222-226; Lucas 1990: 92-96; Tesar and Werner 1995: 467-492) . Lane (2004) emphasizes the impressive pace of financial globalization, but argues that behavioural and informational barrie rs remain significant impediments to a fully unified global capital market.
In this empirical study, we examine the determinants of bilateral FDI flows using a modified gravity model. Our objective is to answer two questions. First, what host country characteristics attract FDI flows? Second, which group of flow is more sensitive to changes in a specific host country characteristic? The first question deals with the direction of impact.
North-North, North-South and South-North FDI flows may all be attracted by similar host country characteristics. The second question deals with the sensitivity of different groups of flows to host country characteristics. For example, although both North-North and NorthSouth FDI are attracted to more developed markets, are North-North flows more sensitive to changes in income? Among many variables commonly used as the determinants of FDI flows in similar studies, we aim to identify what role is specifically played by geography.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, theoretical and empirical evidence on the role of geography on FDI is discussed. Section 3 introduces the benchmark model, explanatory variables and the data. Section 4 reports results from pooled time-series cross-section least squares regression on North-North, North-South and South-North FDI inflows. In Section 5, various sensitivity tests are reported on the robustness of the benchmark model. Section 6 concludes.
Foreign direct investment and geography
Theoretical and empirical work on the effects of geography in international finance is limited compared to international macroeconomics and trade, but fast growing in number (see for example Ghosh and Wolf 1998; Eaton and Tamura 1994: 478-510; Di Mauro 2000; Hausman and Fernandez-Arias 2000; Chunlai 1997; De Menil 1999: 165-201; Wei 1997 Wei , 2000 . Portes and Rey (2000) and Portes et al. (2001: 783-796 ) use a gravity-style approach on a panel data of bilateral equity flows and bonds respectively. Their findings indicate that gross assets flows are negatively correlated with the distance between the two countries. They interpret the negative sign for distance variable as the existence of information costs for equity transactions as part of trading costs. Loungani et al. (2002: 526-543 ) question why gravity models work for asset flows and attempt to explain the "distance" puzzle. They conclude that the "distance" puzzle can be reduced by going beyond consideration of physical distance to concepts of transactional distance and scale economies.
There has been an exponential growth on studies examining the role of geography on bilateral trade flows, especially since the introduction of the gravity model. Such models have had considerable empirical success in explaining bilateral trade flows, and are also theoretically well established (see e.g., Anderson 1979:106-116; Bergstrand 1985: 474-481; Helpman and Krugman 1985; Deardorff, 1995) . Tinbergen (1962) was among the first to present such models. He presented a model in which the volume of trade between any two countries is determined by gross national product (GNP) in home and host country, and the geographic distance between their main economic centres.
Borrowing the gravity model of international trade in this study to explain financial flows can be based on two observations. First, countries with relatively high bilateral trade shares tend to have relatively high bilateral FDI shares. Ghosh and Wolf (1998) argue that 5 trade linkages not only lead to short-term financial linkages through trade financing, but also in the long-term, create demand and supply channels through which domestic firms can access foreign capital. In other words, trade linkages provide information about the host countries through growing familiarity, and making it less costly to invest directly in the same countries.
2 Calvo and Mendoza (2000: 79-113) argue that fixed costs are important in international investment decisions and several authors emphasize at least part of the information cost is fixed (Ghosh and Wolf, 1998) . 3 Goldstein and Razin (2002) argue that there are some fixed set-up costs to investing directly, such as costs of information acquiring.
Bilateral trade linkages may reduce such costs for direct investment.
Second, it is commonly observed that the familiarity effect causes investors to favour close-by countries with similar characteristics and legal systems over more distant and institutionally different countries. Senior (1850) , in his Political Economy, stresses the importance of familiarity with customs, and Cairnes (1874) emphasizes geographical distance, differences in political institutions, language, religion and social customs as barriers to capital flows. In other words, location matters for financial flows as well as for real activity. As the distance to the host country increases, the familiarity may decrease, with the exception of countries that share common historical past (i.e., colonial ties). Another effect of distance specific to FDI is in relation to control. Distance can reduce investors' control. FDI is defined as capital invested with long-lasting interest in an enterprise. Therefore, the concept of control is inherent in this type of investment. In such a case, distance would play a significant role in determining which host countries receive the majority of bilateral FDI flows. On the other hand, international investors may choose FDI over other forms of investment based on the reason that it gives them control. In that case, investment in more distant locations through FDI may be preferable to, for example, portfolio investment. By being closer to the market, investors' control is maximized and information asymmetries are minimized.
The direction of impact of distance on FDI, based on these arguments, is unclear. In the international trade literature, the distance variable is used to proxy for transport costs, implying reduced trade with increased distance. In this study, we argue that, for FDI flows distance may be a proxy for information costs, rather than transport costs. The cost of information gathering would likely increase with distance, as familiarity with the host country's investment opportunities, customs and culture decreases. Most North-North FDI flows are in the form of mergers and acquisitions, implying no physical transfer of assets except in the form of human capital. 4 The transfer of human capital, may in turn be negatively affected by distance, as various studies on international migration find that distance affects costs of migration through increased travel costs, difficulty to get back home and increased cultural and linguistic differences (see e.g., Karemera et al. 2000 Karemera et al. :1745 Karemera et al. -1755 Ximena et al. 2002) .
The primary contribution of this study is to examine the determinants of bilateral FDI flows with a specific focus on geography, and to separate bilateral flows into North-North, North-South and South-North uni-directional flows to compare the differences/similarities between different groups of FDI flows. As such, the results of this study will contribute to international finance literature, by incorporating the geography factor in explaining the spatial concentration of financial flows. Portes and Rey (2000) and Portes et al. (2001: 783-796) have
shown that distance is a significant determinant of bilateral cross-border equity flows and bonds. Our study examines whether distance, among other geography variables, is also a significant determinant of North-North, North-South and South-North FDI. We argue that there are various factors at play that affect information costs differently for North-North, than
North-South or South-North FDI, and hence the potential effect of geographical variables on FDI. This study is closest to Loungani et al. (2002: 526-543) 
The independent variable, Inflw ijt is the ratio of gross bilateral FDI inflows/GDP to host country i from partner country j at time t. 5 In our benchmark regression model, the explanatory variables are POP it , population of host country i at time t, GDPPC it, , GDP per capita of host country i at time t, DIST ij , distance between country i and j, Z ij , a set of control variables, t t , time dummies, d j , source country dummies, and e ijt , is the error term, corrected for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity by using White's covariance matrix estimator. For North-North FDI inflows, the set of source and home countries are identical. Only this group suffers from mirror statistics discrepancies where the same data is reported by two different sources (e.g. US reporting inflows from Japan, and Japan reporting outflows to US). For this reason, NorthNorth FDI flows are calculated as the average of the two values reported by the source and host countries. 6 Instead of annual data, 5-year averages are used to avoid autocorrelation. Time dummies are for t 1 =1980-84, t 2 =1985-89, t 3 =1990-94, t 4 =1995-98. 7 Alternatively, a double-log specification could have been applied. However, this would mean losing considerable efficiency since quite a number of negative observations would have been dropped.
The set of control variables that are included in the regression analysis are mostly dummy variables specific to the host-source country pair: BOR ij and LANG ij take the value of one if the host and source country share a common land border, or a common language, zero otherwise. Additional explanatory variables include, LAT i latitude of the capital city of the host country i, LAND i dummy, that takes the value of one if the host country has no access to any seas and oceans, or navigable waters, zero otherwise, RTA ij dummy, that is one if the host and source country are in a regional trade agreement, zero otherwise, CU ij dummy, that takes the value of one if the host and source countries are in a currency union, zero otherwise.
The primary focus is on the geography variables: distance, border dummy, latitude and landlockedness. The expected sign for distance is negative, implying that as distance increases information costs will also increase and this will have a negative effect on the investment. Border is expected to have a positive impact, implying that for a given distance, countries that share a common border see higher flows. 8 Landlockedness is also commonly used in gravity models. Henderson et al. (2000) argue that being landlocked raises transport costs by more than 50 per cent. The latitude variable is used in the geography of economic development literature to examine cross-country inequality of per capita income levels (see e.g. Gallup et al. 1999 ). In our study, latitude is used as another proxy for remoteness of the host country.
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) and currency union dummy variables can be grouped as integration variables. Economic integration has a direct effect on internationalization by reducing transaction costs, and information costs are a part of transaction costs. Being in a currency union has been shown to have a sig nificant effect on bilateral trade by Rose (1999) . The effect of sharing a common currency is significant even when exchange rate volatility is taken into account. In this paper, the currency union dummy
Occasionally, there are negative FDI inflows into a host country, which may suggest that the source country is repatriating earnings back home. In order to avoid losing these observations, the dependent variable is expressed as a percentage throughout the regression analyses. 8 Parsley and Wei (2000) argue that the national borders have a negative effect on market segmentation (i.e. the border effect), which may explain the home bias in goods and asset trade.
captures a long-term government commitment to integration and decreased exchange rate uncertainty, and possibly increased financial integration. Common language may also be grouped together with integration variables, since especially for North-South category, this dummy variable reflects past colonial rela tionships.
Size and the level of income are reported as important host country determinants especially for market seeking FDI (UNCTAD 1998). As well as a large market to serve to, a larger economy may also present a more diverse opportunity for investment. For financial flows, host country size may reflect greater fixed costs of compliance with local regulations.
By GDP per capita variables, we measure the level of development of the host country.
Results from Benchmark Regressions
The results of the regression analysis on the determinants of North-North, NorthSouth and South-North FDI inflows are reported in Table 1. This table allows 10 The adjusted R 2 decreases to 16 percent for North-South FDI when the currency union dummy is excluded. Some of the estimated coefficients also increase in economic significance.
Robustness Tests
In this part of the analysis, a number of additional control variables are entered in order to check for the robustness of our results. These variables have been found to be significant determinants of FDI flows, or other types of financial flows, in other studies. Since the data for these variables are available for much smaller samples (or for only a few years), their relationship with FDI is examined as robustness tests of our benchmark model.
The Effect of Corruption and Policy on FDI
In Tables 2a and 2b , we examine the effect of government policy (incentives and restrictions) toward FDI and corruption on FDI flows. While FDI specific incentives and restrictions of the government policy indicates the general openness and willingness of the host economy to receive FDI, together with measures of corruption in the host economy, these variables can proxy for investment costs. The relation between corruption and FDI is extensively investigated by Wei (1997 Wei ( , 2000 . In his studies, he finds a statistically significant, negative and robust relationship between corruption and FDI. Table 2a [ Table 2a] For comparison, in Table 2b , we test the effect of corruption and FDI policy on FDI, only this time the dependent variable is the logarithm of FDI inflows. The results are in line with results from Wei (1997 Wei ( , 2000 . Both TI and GCR corruption indices are statistically significant and negatively correlated to North-North and South-North FDI inflows. One unit increase in TI corruption index indicates that host North country receives 18.9 percent less FDI from North source countries and 31.6 percent less FDI from South source countries.
11 GCR index indicates a larger impact of corruption on both North-North and South-North FDI. There is also evidence that FDI incentives are statistically significant and positive for North-North FDI (TI index) and for both North-North and South-North (GCR index).
[ Table 2b ]
In summary, the results from Table 2b concur the results of Wei, indicating that corruption has a negative effect on the level FDI inflows but not on the ratio of FDI to GDP.
It is imperative to highlight (i) both in Table 2a and 2b corruption indices and FDI incentives and restrictions are statistically not significant for North-South FDI inflows, contrary to general concensus 12 (ii) and in both tables, North-South distance and latitude are statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of these variables. In general, these results indicate that geographical variables are not robust to the inclusion of corruption and FDI policy variables for FDI inflows among the developed countries (North-North). Once investment costs are controlled by these proxies, information costs are no longer significant determinants of NorthNorth FDI. In contrast, North-South FDI is predominantly determined by information costs (arising from information asymmetries) rather than investment costs.
The Effect of Legal Code
In Table 3 , the effect of sharing a common legal code is examined. La Porta et al. (1996) show that different commercial laws have different levels of protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, and quality of law enforcement. In other words, the financial development of a country, and ultimately its growth, may be determined by the origins of its 11 Exp (-0.21) -1 = -0.189; Exp (-0.38) -1 = -0.316. 12 Local government corruption is one of the important negative factors that affect foreign investment in developing countries. commercial codes. Feldstein (2000) also argues that global integration of capital markets and increased volume of FDI spread US-UK forms of corporate culture. There is a growing body of literature that suggests Anglo-American law (i.e. common law) improve the efficiency with which capital is invested. Beck et al. (2004) find that a country's legal origin influences its firms' access to foreign finance, and that the firms in countries with French legal origin face significantly higher obstacles in accessing external finance than firms in common law countries. In our sample, the countries are categorized into sharing four different legal codes: English (i.e. the common law), German, French and Scandinavian (i.e. Roman law).
[ Table 3 13 Sharing a common legal origin provides familiarity with the host country institution, and also reduces costs of investment.
North-South FDI inflows, contrary to North-North FDI, are not affected significantly by reduced information costs through increased familiarity. On the other hand, the positive relationship for North-South FDI and trade may be driven by the role of trade in creating familiarity with the host market, and thereby facilitating access of host markets to foreign finance.
The Effect of Trade on FDI
[ Table 4 ]
Both for North-North and North-South, the distance is still a significant determinant of FDI although the semi-elasticity of distance decreases, especially for North-North FDI, when trade is included. This indicates that a large part of the negative effect of distance on North-North FDI flows can be attributed to trade. Although the semi-elasticity of distance is reduced, it is not eliminated, suggesting that partly distance does proxy information costs.
Size and GDP per capita become statistically significant for all when trade is introduced to the model, suggesting that size and level of development do have a statistically significant relation with FDI independent of their relation through trade. When trade is included in the model, the R 2 s remain similar to the results from Table 1, indicating that the explanatory power of the specification is not improved significantly. we augment the distance variable. Telephone call traffic is a direct measure of information flows between countries, which has been used in studies by Portes and Rey (2000) , Portes et al (2001: 783-796) and Loungani et al. (2002: 526-543 ) and shown to have a significant and positive relation with portfolio equity and FDI flows. We expect that the effect of telephone call traffic be positive on bilateral FDI. The more telephone calls (in minutes) (i.e. the more the information flow), the higher is FDI.
The Effect of Actual Information Flows on FDI: Telephone Call Traffic

[Table 5]
The results indicate that when telephone call traffic is entered into the equation, the distance variable becomes insignificant for North-North FDI. This might mean that distance is a proxy for the ability to communicate and actual flows of information for North-North FDI.
In contrast, North-South distance variable is robust and economically more significant even when telephone call traffic and trade variables are included in the model. This indicates that for North-South FDI, there are significant information costs and these costs have a negative effect on FDI. In fact, the explanatory power of the model also increases to 82 percent (Table   5 ) from 74 percent (Table 4) . One problem with the telephone call traffic variable is that it is potentially endogenous: more FDI inflows will require more scrutiny. Loungani et al. (2002: 526-543) have shown that information infrastructure can also play a significant role in reducing the distance puzzle. 16 Workers' remittances can be used as a proxy for personal phone calls; however, it is not available in bilateral form. In aggregate form, Mexico, Turkey and Brazil are among the highest receiver of workers' remittances and also telephone calls (from developed countries).
Other Robustness Tests
As part of our robustness tests, we have also examined the sensitivity of our results to i) outliers ii) zero observations iii) US dollar movements iv) South sample excluding Israel, Korea, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei and Singapore v) the inclusion of a remoteness measure vi) method of estimation by using a fixed-effects model.
The outliers from 20 The variables that were significant previously decline in economic significance. The R 2 for South-North FDI is 15 percent when outliers are excluded, compared to 7 percent previously.
Next, the effect of zero observations on the results has been examined. 21 Since our left-hand side variable is a ratio, not in logs as in most other studies, zero observations are not dropped out. The regression equations in Table 1 are rerun excluding zero observations. The single change in the results is that GDP per capita becomes a significant determinant of South-North FDI inflows (ß = -0.003). 17 The residuals that are beyond two standard deviation of the regression are classified as outliers. 18 The outliers for North-North flows include flows to Australia from Japan and US, to Austria from Germany, to Belgium-Luxembourg from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, and US, to Canada from US, to Finland from Sweden, to Netherlands from Japan, UK and US, to New Zealand from Australia, UK and US, to Norway from UK, to Sweden from Finland and to Switzerland and UK from US. 19 The outliers for North-South flows include flows from Germany to Argentina, from Japan to Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, from Switzerland to Panama, and from US to Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Panama and Singapore, and from UK to Malaysia and Singapore. 20 The outliers for South-North flows include flows from Singapore to Australia, BelgiumLuxembourg, and New Zealand, from Indonesia to New Zealand, from Mexico to BelgiumLuxe mbourg, from Hong Kong to Belgium-Luxembourg, New Zealand, and from Malaysia to New Zealand. 21 Zero observations indicate to lack of FDI flows, not to missing data.
We have also tested the sensitivity of our results to US dollar movements. As a robustness measure, we have introduced the US dollar real exchange rate relative to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). 22 The movement of the dollar with respect to the SDR is one way of measuring the stability of the dollar (Mundell 2002 ). The benchmark model in Table 1 and its results are robust even when we control for US dollar movements. For all groups, the statistical and economic significance of our variables remained unchanged. The reason for this may be because the effect of large US dollar movements was already controlled for in our model by time dummies. Some year dummies were also highly collinear with our US/SDR real exchange rate variable.
Next, we tested the sensitivity of our results to an unambiguously-South sample by excluding five countries from the original sample: Israel, Korea, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei and Singapore. These countries indeed have achieved high rates of growth in the last decade, with well functioning market economies. 23 The statistical significance of results on the geography variables are unchanged both for the flows from North to South and from South to North.
We have introduced a GDP-weighted remoteness measure (see Rose 1999) in order to further check the robustness of our geography variables. 24 The distance variable is statistically robust to the inclusion of this variable, but its economic significance is reduced in the NorthNorth and North-South samples. For the South-North sample, distance becomes statistically significant at ten per cent and has the expected negative sign. Remoteness variable itself is statistically insignificant for all groups. 22 The US/SDR end-of-period exchange rates are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The US price level is measured by the US GDP deflator and the foreign price level is measured by the SDR deflator for 1980-1998, calculated by the author using changing weights of G5 currencies in the SDR basket. 23 Israel is classified as an advanced economy by the IMF and the World Bank. Korea and Singapore meet most benchmarks of a developed country but resist being classified as such. Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) and Hong Kong are considered developed by some organizations. However, China, a developing country claims the land of the first and exercises sovereignty over the latter. 24 Latitude variable is excluded in this specification.
Finally, sensitivity of the results to method of estimation was checked by using a fixed-effects model instead of pooled OLS. Broadly, the results are the same. The details of the model and results from a two-step fixed-effects model can be obtained from the author along with others.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the determinants of FDI flows with an emphasis on the role of geography to highlight the factors that affect the spatial allocation of FDI. The objective of this paper was to examine the role of geography in explaining the patterns of financial integration among both developed and developing countries. The results indicate that standard gravity and other control variables have the same impact on each bilateral flow.
The differences arise in the magnitude of the economic effect of these variables. The results from our benchmark model indicate that geographical factors are significant and robust determinants of North-South FDI inflows. In comparison, the effect of geographical variables is mixed and often not robust for North-North FDI inflows.
It must be highlighted that our results contradict Loungani et al. (2002: 526-543 ) who find that the distance puzzle remains even when the actual information flows are accounted for (by way of including the volume of tele phone traffic). We observe two distinct results for the North-North and North-South FDI flows. We find that the negative effect of physical distance (distance puzzle) is no longer significant when we account for the volume of information flows (i.e. the telephone traffic) and trade between two developed countries. In contrast, the negative effect of distance is strengthened when the same variables are accounted for for North to South FDI flows. This, we conclude, implies that there are significant information costs as part of transaction costs to direct investment between North and South countries, which in turn may explain why financial integration has been restricted to a few developing countries while most have no access to FDI.
We conclude that geographical factors have a significant role in explaining the t-statistics in parentheses. * indicates 10% significance level, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances calculated. t-statistics in parentheses.
APPENDIX A
Source country dummies are used in all regressions. * indicates 10% significance level, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance. 
